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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a corporation takes control of an existing business operation, optimally, the 
acquired operation’s existing labor force continues business as usual for its new “successor 
employer.”  In this ideal scenario, the successor employer minimizes costs associated with 
training new labor, and existing employees clearly benefit by retaining their jobs.  In the 
alternative, consider the “mild disaster” that occurred at a beef slaughter plant in Iowa, where a 
successor employer fired the existing labor force and hired untrained replacements.1  During the 
new employees’ first shift, production proceeded at an “exceedingly slow pace” and substantial 
amounts of beef were destroyed or damaged.2  The costs inherent in hiring a new work force 
clearly reduce a successor employer’s incentive to terminate its predecessor’s employees.3 
Yet, the recent holding by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Local 348-S v. Meridian Management Corp.4 likely will cause more successor employers to 
reassess these costs and consider hiring a new work force.  Meridian held that, based solely on a 
work force’s “substantial continuity” from predecessor to successor operations, a successor 
employer must arbitrate under the terms of any existing collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”) between the predecessor employer and the continuing work force’s union.5  In short, if 
a successor employer hires a majority of its predecessor’s labor force, that successor employer 
unconditionally must arbitrate pursuant to the predecessor’s CBA.  The Meridian decision splits 
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s holding in AmeriSteel Corp. v. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Packing House and Indust. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 1978). 
2 Id. 
3 See Wilson McLeod, Rekindling Labor Law Successorship In an Era of Decline, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
271, 300 n.115 (1994). 
4 Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2009). 
5 See id. at 76 (“[W]here there are sufficient indicia of substantial continuity of identity of the workforce, it is 
possible that a successor employer will be bound at least by some of the substantive terms of a pre-existing CBA.  
Determining the extent to which the successor employer is bound by the preexisting agreement, however, is a 
question for the arbitrator.”). 
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International Brotherhood of Teamsters6 that an unconsenting successor employer is not bound 
to arbitrate when the majority of the predecessor employer’s work force is hired.7  Not only does 
the Second Circuit’s opinion have negative policy implications (e.g., promoting circumvention of 
the arbitration requirement by not hiring a predecessor’s existing work force), but the holding 
stands at odds with three United States Supreme Court decisions that dictate labor law 
successorship.8 
The Court set forth the successorship doctrine in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,9 
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,10 and Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and 
Restaurant Employees11 (collectively, the “Successorship Trilogy” or “Trilogy”).  These cases 
outlined the duties imposed on a successor employer by an existing CBA between the 
predecessor employer and incumbent labor union.12  Due to certain inconsistencies among the 
three holdings, the Successorship Trilogy has a “history of bedeviling courts” and wreaking 
havoc across many of America’s unionized industries.13   
In particular, Wiley and Burns have been viewed as standing in “direct conflict” with one 
another and have created a “tension . . . in this trilogy,” which Howard Johnson, the final case of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 266, 267 (3d Cir. 2001). 
7 See generally Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Second Circuit Review; Successor Employers Bound By Prior 
Collective Bargaining Pact, N.Y.L.J. (Online) (Oct. 28, 2009) (noting that Meridian creates a split with the Third 
Circuit). 
8 See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 81–82 (Livingston, J., dissenting).  
9 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (holding that a successor employer could be bound to 
arbitrate with an incumbent union if substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise exists). 
10 NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (noting that a successor employer is not automatically 
bound to the substantive terms of the CBA between the predecessor employer and the incumbent union).  
11 Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (holding that if substantial continuity of 
identity in the business enterprise does not exist, a successor employer will not be bound to arbitrate with an 
incumbent union). 
12 See generally Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 7, at *1 (discussing successor employer obligations). 
13 Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (Livingston, J., dissenting); Edward B. 
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L. REV. 203, 203 
(1993) (“Courts have struggled repeatedly to define the legal obligations of the buyer of a business that has 
unionized workers.”). 
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the Trilogy, does not resolve.14  The two main unresolved issues of the Trilogy are (1) whether 
an unconsenting successor employer has a duty to arbitrate any disputes with the incumbent 
union under the arbitration clause of the preexisting CBA (the issue on which AmeriSteel and 
Meridian diverge), and (2) “whether and to what extent” an arbitrator can impose any 
substantive terms of a preexisting CBA on an unconsenting successor.15  Some scholars view an 
arbitration clause as a substantive term and, thus, conflate the duty to arbitrate with the adoption 
of the substantive terms of a prior CBA.16  This Comment considers the two questions to be 
distinct and focuses upon and offers a solution solely regarding the duty to arbitrate. 
With respect to the AmeriSteel and Meridian split, this Comment proposes that the Third 
Circuit arrived at the correct result (i.e., the successor was not required to arbitrate when only 
substantial continuity is satisfied), but that the court’s underlying logic, in reaching that result, 
“flatly contradicts the holding of Wiley.”17  In contrast, the Second Circuit relied too heavily 
upon the “substantial continuity of identity” factor established in Wiley.18  In doing so, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 268, 270 (3d Cir. 2001). 
15 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 66. 
16 Matthew M. McCluer, Reading the Fine Print: Emerging Views on the Successorship Doctrine and Mandatory 
Arbitration Provisions, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 85, 105 (2012) (In determining whether a successor can be bound to 
arbitrate under a predecessor’s CBA, the author contends that the arbitration clause is a substantive term.  The article 
sets forth a “two-step analysis,” which applies for imposing substantive terms of a predecessor’s CBA, including 
finding a duty to arbitrate.  First, there must be substantial continuity and, second, additional contractual 
justifications must exist.  The article identifies two well-defined and non-controversial scenarios where such 
contractual justification exists: (1) where the successor is an alter ego of the predecessor; and (2) where the 
successor has expressly or impliedly assumed the obligations of its predecessor’s CBA.  The article, however, fails 
to propose any additional justifications for imposing a duty to arbitrate and other substantive terms.  Rather, the 
author states that a duty to arbitrate cannot be imposed on an unconsenting, non-alter-ego successor employer and 
should be “limited to situations involving virtual identity of business operations between the predecessor and 
successor employers.”  Yet, the author does not articulate the meaning of “virtual identity of business operations” or 
develop a functional standard beyond the two well-defined scenarios.) 
17 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 281 (Becker, C.J., dissenting).  
18 See Meridian, 583 F. 3d at 81 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (“The majority tries to justify its result by heavy reliance 
on [Wiley], but in so doing misreads Wiley and ignores several subsequent Supreme Court cases that have 
interpreted Wiley not to permit what the majority does today.”). 
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Meridian court set a dangerous precedent that will incentivize “would-be successor employers to 
simply fire the unionized employees and start over.”19   
Forcing new employers to arbitrate under a predecessor’s CBA whenever “substantial 
continuity of identity” in a workforce exists will cause employers to refrain from rehiring 
unionized employees to “elude the grasp of the successorship doctrine.”20  Under Meridian’s 
approach, employers must “weigh the benefits of retaining experienced workers with the 
possibly lengthy pitfalls of litigating, appealing, arbitrating, and potentially relitigating” when a 
duty to arbitrate is imposed on them.21  Furthermore, choosing not to hire a predecessor’s 
unionized workers will lead to inexperienced workers occupying these newly vacant positions, 
potentially resulting in inferior work product and a greater probability of liability arising from 
employee negligence.22  As a consequence, more skilled laborers will be unemployed, leading to 
greater industrial strife and social turmoil.23  Therefore, public and economic policy supports 
narrowly defining the instances in which successor employers are required to arbitrate. 
This Comment proposes that, in a similar vein as Judge Livingston’s dissent in Meridian, 
the federal courts impose a limited bright-line rule that successor employers arbitrate under the 
terms of a preexisting CBA in the following four scenarios: (1) when a successor employer has 
implicitly or explicitly assumed the CBA, (2) when a successor employer is an alter ego of the 
predecessor, (3) when a successor employer is a product of a merger with the predecessor 
(whereby the predecessor ceases to exist) and substantial continuity exists, or (4) when 
substantial continuity exists and state successor liability law supports a requirement to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Id. at 86.   
20 Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
21 Kevin A. Teters, Case Note, Successor Employer’s Obligations Under a Preexisting Collective Bargaining 
Agreement: The Second Circuit Misinterprets Supreme Court Decisions and Sets a Harmful Precedent, 76 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 143, 150 (2011). 
22 McLeod, supra note 3, at 299. 
23 See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964); see also NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. 
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 282 (1972). 
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arbitrate.24  In developing this argument, Part II sets forth the policy of the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”) and describes the collective bargaining process.  This section also 
discusses the limitations placed on private employers and labor unions by the NLRA, the 
purpose and status of a CBA, and the impact of a successor employer’s duty to bargain with an 
incumbent union.  Part III then addresses the Supreme Court precedent on a successor 
employer’s duty to arbitrate by discussing the Successorship Trilogy.  Part IV turns to the current 
split between the United States Courts of Appeals and the existing conflict in the Trilogy.  
Finally, Part V urges the federal courts to adopt a bright-line rule when imposing a duty to 
arbitrate on successor employers. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of the National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining Agreements 
 The main body of labor law governing collective bargaining between private employers 
and employees is the National Labor Relations Act.25  The NLRA grants employees the right to 
affiliate themselves with labor unions and to bargain collectively with employers via unions or 
self-chosen representatives.26  The fundamental purpose of collective bargaining is to establish 
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment.27  These negotiated terms, 
rights, and duties of the parties are then organized into, and agreed to by both parties in, a written 
contract known as a CBA, 28  which governs the relationship between labor unions and 
employers.29   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 84 (Livingston, J., dissenting).  
25 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
26 § 157. 
27 § 159. 
28 § 158(d). 
29 Mark E. Zelek, Labor Grievance Arbitration in the United States, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 197 
(1989). 
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CBAs are not treated like ordinary contracts; rather, they enjoy an exalted status.30  A 
CBA is “more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the 
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.”31  The CBA covers the complete employment relationship 
and “calls into being a new common law – the common law of a particular industry or of a 
particular plant.”32  Despite the fact that a CBA is created by two parties, it is by no means “in 
any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship.” 33  Under normal contract 
principles, a successor employer would not be bound to a predecessor’s contract without 
consent.34  Under a CBA, however, a successor employer can be bound to a predecessor’s CBA 
without consent because a CBA “is not an ordinary contract.”35   
In two well-defined scenarios, a successor employer is obliged to honor the preexisting 
CBA: first, when it has expressly or impliedly assumed the CBA36 and second, when it is simply 
an “alter ego” of the predecessor employer.37  A successor employer will be bound when it 
expressly assumes the CBA by voluntarily agreeing to the terms of the preexisting CBA.38  
Likewise, when there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that a successor employer has 
impliedly agreed to be bound by the CBA, the successor is bound by the predecessor’s CBA.39  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). 
31 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578–79 (1960) (citing Dean Shulman, 
Reason, Contract, and the Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1004–05 (1955)). 
32 Id. at 579. 
33 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550. 
34 See id. 
35 Id. (emphasis added). 
36 Southward v. S. Cent. Ready Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[I]f a successor voluntarily 
assumes the obligations of its predecessor’s CBA, then it will be bound by its predecessor’s CBA.”). 
37 Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
38 In re Plaza Mission Bottling Co., 14 B.R. 428 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (president of the subsequent company 
expressly stated at a meeting held prior to the formation of the new company that he would continue to observe the 
terms and conditions set forth in the CBA); United Steelworkers v. Deutz-Allis Corp., No. 86-0166-CV-W-0, 1986 
WL 6852,  (W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1986) (successor announced in a letter that it had assumed the labor contract). 
39 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pine Valley Div. of Ethan Allen, Inc., 544 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1976) (successor employer 
continued to deduct union dues and made contributions to union’s welfare account from employee paychecks, 
therefore successor conformed to the terms of the CBA). 
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For example, in Audit Services, Inc. v. Rolfson,40 a successor employer that continued to make 
trust fund contributions on behalf of union workers, but not non-union workers, was bound to the 
former CBA because it displayed a pattern of conforming to the terms of the former CBA.41   
In the second scenario, under the “alter ego” doctrine, the successor employer is “merely 
a disguised continuance of the old employer.”42  Instances where a successor employer is in fact 
an alter ego of the predecessor “involve a mere technical change in the structure or identity of the 
employing entity, frequently to avoid the effect of the labor laws, without any substantial change 
in ownership or management.”43  Courts consider whether the two entities have substantially 
identical stockholders, officers, directors, management, operations, equipment, and customers.44  
For example, consider a family-operated business passed from the patriarch to another family 
member who had been involved in operations and who attempts to establish the business as a 
new and separate entity.45  The new entity is an “alter ego” of the original business because it 
shares the same management and is substantially identical to the predecessor.46  Courts disagree, 
however, regarding duties of successorship in scenarios not encompassed within these two 
situations.47 
B. Overview of an Employer’s Duty to Bargain 
 In order to initiate the collective bargaining process that results in a CBA, the NLRA 
imposes on an employer a duty to bargain with labor union representatives when a majority of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Audit Servs., Inc. v. Rolfson, 641 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981). 
41 Id. at 763–64. 
42 Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).  
43 Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974). 
44 R.R. Maint. Laborers’ Local 1274 v. Kelly R.R. Contractors, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 889, 896 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 
(“Important factors to consider are whether the two entities have substantially identical management, business 
purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervisors and ownership.  The substantial continuity of the work force 
is frequently a major issue in alter ego determinations.”) (internal citation omitted). 
45 See generally Midwest Precision Heating and Cooling, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.3d 450 (8th Cir. 2005).  
46 Id. at 459. 
47 See, e.g., AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 271 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that “no 
special significance should be attached to the fact that Wiley involved a merger[,]” and state law backdrop, which 
influenced the duty to arbitrate in Wiley, should not induce successor’s labor law obligations). 
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employees are union members.48  The obligation to bargain, however, does not end upon 
negotiation of a CBA; instead, it “unquestionably extends . . . and applies to labor-management 
relations during the term of an agreement.”49  For instance, an employer is not permitted to make 
a unilateral change to any condition or requirement included in the CBA without notifying the 
union and providing it with an opportunity to negotiate.50  
Yet, successor employers are not always held to the duty to bargain when a predecessor 
employer transfers its business to the successor.51  Beyond the two well-defined instances 
previously discussed, the duty to bargain as a successor employer only arises when an employer 
acquires an organized business and there is “substantial continuity of the business enterprise” 
between the old employer and new employer.52  In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. 
NLRB, 53  the Supreme Court established a factor-based test to determine the “substantial 
continuity of identity of the business enterprise” standard.54  The existence of “substantial 
continuity” in assessing a duty to bargain hinges upon:  
[(1)] whether the business of both employers is essentially the same; [(2)] whether the 
employees of the new company are doing the same jobs in the same working conditions 
under the same supervisors; and [(3)] whether the new entity has the same production 
process, produces the same products, and basically has the same body of customers.55   
 
An employer may attempt to evade the duty to bargain by intentionally failing to satisfy 
this “substantial continuity” standard, most notably, by not hiring a majority of the predecessor’s 
unionized employees.56  The refusal to hire an employee because of union membership, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
49 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967) (internal citation omitted). 
50 See Union-Tribune Pub. Co., 353 NLRB No. 2, at *19 (2008). 
51 See B. Glenn George, Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 279 (1988). 
52 Id.  
53 Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). 
54 Id. at 43; see also Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2009). 
55 Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43. 
56 George, supra note 51, at 290. 
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constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA.57  Accordingly, unions frequently 
claim that the absence of a majority of the predecessor’s employees in the successor’s work force 
is a result of discriminatory hiring practices.58 
C. Overview of Arbitration’s Role in Labor Law 
As comprehensive as a CBA may be, it is virtually impossible to provide for every 
contingency in the employer-employee relationship.  Inevitably, disputes between the union and 
the employer will arise.59  Usually, the parties acknowledge this reality and provide for an 
arbitration clause in the CBA, which allows these disputes to be resolved through a grievance 
process culminating in binding arbitration.60  Arbitration has played a central role in effectuating 
national labor policy,61 and it is federal policy to resolve labor disputes arising out of a CBA 
through arbitration.62  The Supreme Court described arbitration as “the substitute for industrial 
strife,” and as “part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.”63  
III. THE SUCCESSORSHIP TRILOGY 
A. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston 
In Wiley, the Supreme Court first introduced the idea that a successor employer could be 
bound by an arbitration clause in a CBA between the predecessor employer and its unionized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006). 
58 George, supra note 51, at 290–91. 
59 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (“Arbitration is the means of 
solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide 
for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties.  The 
processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are 
given to the collective bargaining agreement.”); see also Jared S. Gross, Note, In Search of Wiley: Struggling to 
Bind Successor Corporations to Their Predecessor’s Collective Bargaining Agreement, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
113, 117 (2004).  
60  Paul Trapani, Note, Old Presumptions Never Die: Rethinking the Steelworker’s Trilogy Presumption of 
Arbitration in Deciding the Arbitratability of Side Letters, 83 TUL. L. REV. 559, 559–60 (2008).  
61 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964). 
62 United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). 
63 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549; Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578. 
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employees. 64   In that case, Interscience Publishers, Inc. (“Interscience”), the predecessor 
employer, merged with John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Wiley”), the successor employer, and ceased 
to do business as a separate entity.65  Prior to the merger, an AFL-CIO union entered into a CBA 
with Interscience, which covered half of the Interscience workers.66  After the merger, Wiley 
retained all of Interscience’s employees, but refused to recognize the union as a bargaining agent 
or fulfill any obligations under the Interscience CBA.67  The union then brought suit against 
Wiley to compel arbitration under the CBA, claiming that Wiley was bound by the agreement’s 
arbitration provision.68  Wiley argued that it was never a party to the CBA and that the merger 
effectively terminated the Interscience CBA.69  
 The Supreme Court concluded that Wiley had a duty to arbitrate with the union under the 
preexisting CBA.70  The Court’s analysis in Wiley laid the groundwork for determining whether 
a successor employer has a duty to arbitrate.  It held that “[s]ubstantial continuity of identity in 
the business enterprise” before and after the change must exist in order to require arbitration 
under the preexisting CBA.71  The Court regarded the “wholesale transfer of Interscience 
employees to the Wiley plant, apparently without difficulty[,]” as satisfying the “substantial 
continuity” condition.72  The Court, however, left the “substantial continuity” concept undefined, 
leaving lower courts confused as to whether a duty to arbitrate was limited to the merger context, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578 (“The present federal policy is to promote industrial 
stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement.  A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the 
inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
65 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 545.  
66 Id. at 544. 
67 Id. at 545–46.  
68 Id. at 545. 
69 Id. at 547.  
70 Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2009). 
71 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551. 
72 Id. 
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and as to what was “substantial” enough when a business continued after a change in 
ownership.73   
 In addition to “substantial continuity,” state successor liability law helped buttress the 
decision to require Wiley to arbitrate.74  The Court looked to New York’s Business Corporation 
Law, which states that a merged corporation is liable on all contracts of both predecessor 
corporations.75  While “the Supreme Court did not rely principally on common law successor 
liability rules in Wiley, it did refer to those principles as a partial explanation for its result.”76  
 Wiley also reiterated general principles of national labor policy, the role of arbitration, 
and the status of CBAs in forming its opinion.77  The Court held that national labor policy 
favored arbitration as the means of settling labor disputes,78 and opined that arbitration protects 
against industrial strife and is a central component in the CBA relationship.79  Thus, the Wiley 
Court believed that, in examining successor employer disputes, a balancing test that attempts 
equally to protect employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship and 
unconsenting employers from being bound to a contract to which they were not a party must be 
applied.80  The Court stressed that a CBA is “not an ordinary contract” and that, unlike other 
contracts, an unconsenting successor may be bound by its terms.81 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 74; see also AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 268 (3d Cir. 
2001).  
74 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548. 
75 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 80 (Livingston, J., dissenting); see also Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548. 
76 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 81 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
77 See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549.  
78 Id. 
79 Id.; see also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (“[A]rbitration is 
the substitute for industrial strife. . . .  [A]rbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part 
and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.”). 
80 See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549–50. 
81 Id. 
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B. NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. 
 In Burns, the Court did not address whether a duty to arbitrate existed; instead, it looked 
to whether a successor employer could be bound by the substantive terms of the previous CBA.82  
In that case, Wackenhut Corporation (“Wackenhut”) provided security protection services for 
Lockheed Aircraft Service Co. (“Lockheed”) at one of its plants under a one-year service 
agreement.83  Once the contract expired, Lockheed called for bids from various companies 
supplying these services, and Burns International Security Services, Inc. (“Burns”) outbid 
Wackenhut, winning the security contract.84  Burns hired a majority of Wackenhut’s employees 
already employed at the plant, but refused to honor the existing CBA between Wackenhut and 
the incumbent union.85  The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”), and the NLRB ordered Burns to honor the Wackenhut CBA.86  
 In its decision, the Supreme Court first found that Burns had a duty to recognize and 
bargain with the incumbent union because it represented a majority of the employees hired by 
Burns.87  According to the Court, “[t]he source of [Burns’] duty to bargain with the union is not 
the [CBA] but the fact that it voluntarily took over a bargaining unit that was largely intact.”88  
Second, the Court held that Burns could not be bound against its will by the substantive terms of 
the preexisting CBA.89  In reaching this decision, the Court stated that Section 8(d) of the 
NLRA90 and legislative history of labor laws hold that “although successor employers may be 
bound to recognize and bargain with the union, they are not bound by the substantive provisions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2001). 
83 NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 274 (1972). 
84 Id. at 275. 
85 Id. at 276. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. at 280–81. 
88 Id. at 287. 
89 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 282. 
90 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
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of a [CBA] negotiated by their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by them.”91  While 
recognizing the general principles underlying labor disputes, the Court held that the goal of 
preventing industrial strife did not override the “bargaining freedom of employers and unions.”92  
It reasoned that binding a successor employer to the substantive terms of a preexisting CBA 
“may result in serious inequities.”93  One such inequity is the restraint on the flow of capital 
because potential employers would be unwilling to rescue failing businesses if they cannot 
negotiate their own CBAs.94  Finally, the Court held that contract terms between employers and 
unions should “correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties.”95  Therefore, forcing 
successor employers into unconsented contracts would offset the “balance of bargaining 
advantage.”96 
Burns provided ambiguous direction for the lower courts because it partially contradicts 
Wiley and did not address whether an arbitration clause comprises one of the substantive terms of 
a CBA.97  Wiley establishes that an unconsenting successor employer may have a duty to 
arbitrate with an incumbent union, thereby potentially imposing the substantive terms of the 
preexisting CBA on the successor.98  In spite of this, Burns held that an unconsenting successor 
employer cannot be bound to the substantive terms of a preexisting CBA, even if “substantial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Burns, 406 U.S. at 284 (internal citation omitted). 
92 Id. at 287 (“Preventing industrial strife is an important aim of federal labor legislation, but Congress has not 
chosen to make the bargaining freedom of employers and unions totally subordinate to this goal. . . .  This 
bargaining freedom means both that parties need not make any concessions as a result of Government compulsion 
and that they are free from having contract provisions imposed upon them against their will.”). 
93 Id. 
94 See id. at 287–88 (“A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make 
changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task assignment, and nature of 
supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and conditions of employment contained in the old 
collective-bargaining contract may make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of 
capital.”). 
95 Id. at 288. 
96 Id. 
97 AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 2001). 
98 Id. at 270. 
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continuity of identity” exists.99  Such a holding left courts wondering if it is still acceptable to 
force successors to arbitrate and potentially be found liable for the CBA.100   
Despite the glaring contradiction, Burns’ opinion provided certain clues to reconciling the 
Trilogy.  In Burns, the Court suggested that Wiley occurred against a backdrop of state successor 
liability law; thus, providing guidance on what is influential in compelling arbitration, in addition 
to substantial continuity.101  Furthermore, the Court identified two levels of liability for successor 
employers: the duty to arbitrate and the obligation to adopt substantive terms of a previous 
CBA.102  Burns provides guidance regarding the heightened duty to adopt a prior CBA, which 
typically occurs when the CBA provisions are assumed and when the alter ego doctrine applies, 
and distinguishes the substantial continuity factor and how it applies to the successor’s duties.103   
C. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees 
Two years after Burns, Howard Johnson took up the issue of labor law successorship, 
with scholars and practitioners hoping that the Supreme Court would resolve conflicting 
reasoning of Wiley and Burns.104  They were disappointed, however, when the Court refused to 
“decide . . . whether there [was] any irreconcilable conflict between Wiley and Burns.”105  
Instead, Howard Johnson simply answered the question of whether a new employer had a duty to 
arbitrate in a fact pattern that contrasted with Wiley.106  Nevertheless, where Howard Johnson 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 286–87. 
100 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 270.  
101 See Burns, 406 U.S. at 286 (“[Wiley] dealt with a merger occurring against a background of state law that 
embodied the general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the 
disappearing corporation.”). 
102 See id. (recognizing that a duty to arbitrate exists because Wiley established it, but also that the duty to arbitrate 
does not require the successor employer to honor the substantive terms of a predecessor’s CBA). 
103 See id. at 282, 287. 
104 See AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 271.  
105 Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974). 
106 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 271. 
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succeeds is in its ultimate outcome and reiteration of salient factors to be used in determining 
where a successor employer has a duty to arbitrate. 
In Howard Johnson, Grissom, the predecessor employer, agreed to sell its equipment and 
transfer operation of its restaurant and motor lodge to Howard Johnson Co. (“Howard Johnson”), 
the successor employer.107  Howard Johnson refused to assume the existing CBA between 
Grissom and the incumbent union, and hired only nine out of fifty-three of the union-represented, 
former Grissom employees.108  The union then filed an action against Howard Johnson, seeking 
an order to compel Howard Johnson “to arbitrate the extent of [its] obligations to the Grissom 
employees under the bargaining agreements.”109 
In arriving at a decision, the Court chose to compare the leading distinctions between the 
facts presented in Wiley to the facts of the case at hand.110  First, it emphasized the fact that Wiley 
involved a merger, “as a result of which the initial employing entity completely disappeared.” 111  
In contrast, Howard Johnson only involved the sale of some assets, and the original employer 
remained in existence.112  This distinction was significant because, in Wiley, state successorship 
liability law “embodied the general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is 
liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation.”113  Recognition of such state liability 
law supports a finding of a duty to arbitrate because it “may have been fairly within the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.”114  Second, the Court emphasized that because the former 
employer continued to exist in Howard Johnson, the union “[had] a realistic remedy to enforce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 251. 
108 Id. at 252. 
109 Id. at 252–53. 
110 Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2009). 
111 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257. 
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113 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 286 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114 Id. 
	   17	  
their contractual obligations.”115  Whereas in Wiley, the former employer ceased to exist, thus 
making arbitration essential between the union and the successor employer.116  Third, and most 
importantly, “in Wiley the surviving corporation hired all of the employees of the disappearing 
corporation[,]” whereas in Howard Johnson, the new employer “hired only a small fraction of 
the predecessors’ employees.”117  Accordingly, the Court found that, based on these factors, 
there was no “substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise” before and after 
Howard Johnson became the new employer.118  Therefore, Howard Johnson had no duty to 
arbitrate under the CBA.119   
Furthermore, the Court shed additional light on the scope of the “substantial continuity” 
requirement.  It declared the critical issue in assessing “substantial continuity” is whether there is 
“a substantial continuity in the identity of the work force across the change in ownership.”120  
The Court held that the requisite continuity of the work force was present in Wiley because a 
“wholesale transfer” of employees occurred between employers; however, Howard Johnson did 
not meet this requirement because the new employer only hired a minority of employees.121 
Although Howard Johnson did little to clarify existing conflicts in the successorship 
doctrine, it nevertheless constructively underscored the importance of “substantial continuity” in 
determining a duty to arbitrate.122  Howard Johnson’s main contribution is its holding that a lack 
of substantial continuity would place a case outside the ambit of Wiley.123  Howard Johnson 
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116 Id. 
117 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S at 250, 258. 
118 Id. at 263. 
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120 Id.; see also Century Vertical Sys., Inc. v. Local No. 1, 379 Fed. App’x 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Local 
348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2009). 
121 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S at 263. 
122 AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The Howard Johnson Court, 
however, chose not to deal with [the conflict of Burns and Wiley], and instead walked a very narrow path.”). 
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merely applied the principles set forth in Wiley to a situation where substantial continuity was 
unequivocally recognized as not being present.  The Court “simply pointed out that, consistent 
with Wiley, and on Wiley’s own terms, the lack of substantial continuity meant that the Court 
needed to look no further” in determining whether a successor must submit to arbitration against 
its will.124  Howard Johnson acknowledged and reinforced the policy outlined in Burns, in 
maintaining that a successor may be bound to arbitrate but that it will not be automatically bound 
to the substantive provisions of the predecessor’s CBA or have any obligation to hire the 
predecessor’s employees.125 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 In the wake of the Successorship Trilogy, lower federal courts had no difficulty following 
Burns’ mandate, finding that unconsenting successor employers are not bound by the substantive 
terms of their predecessors’ CBAs.126  Yet, the lower courts struggled to reconcile the holdings 
of the three Supreme Court cases in applying the duty to arbitrate to successor employers.127 In 
AmeriSteel, the Third Circuit held that (1) “substantial continuity of identity” is necessary but not 
sufficient to find a duty to arbitrate, and (2) because Burns will not bind an unconsenting 
successor to the substantial terms of a prior CBA, any arbitration imposed by such a duty will be 
futile.128  Later, the Second Circuit considered the same problem in Meridian and held that 
“substantial continuity of identity” alone was sufficient in finding a successor’s duty to arbitrate, 
thus creating a circuit split.129  The following section explains the current circuit split and how 
the lower federal courts interpreted the conflict in the Trilogy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Id. at 272. 
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126 See id. at 275–76. 
127 See generally, id. at 277–78 (Becker, C.J., dissenting); see also Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 
65, 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
128 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 265, 269. 
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A. AmeriSteel Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Third Circuit 
 In AmeriSteel, AmeriSteel Corporation (“AmeriSteel”), a successor employer, purchased 
various assets of Brocker Rebar, the predecessor employer, including a manufacturing facility.130  
A CBA existed between Brocker Rebar and its employees’ union, but AmeriSteel insisted that it 
was not bound by the CBA, and therefore, it had no duty to arbitrate under its terms.131  As 
AmeriSteel hired the majority of the union employees who had worked for Brocker Rebar, the 
court required the company to bargain with the union.132  Bargaining broke down between the 
parties, and AmeriSteel refused to recognize the union.133  Thereafter, the union requested 
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the CBA.134  AmeriSteel refused and sought to 
enjoin the union from proceeding to arbitration with AmeriSteel as a party.135  
 The Third Circuit attempted to navigate the Successorship Trilogy by examining each 
decision individually.136  In reviewing Wiley, the court found the holding to be limited to the 
merger context in which a predecessor employer disappears.137  The Third Circuit then identified 
“substantial continuity of identity” as a necessary ingredient in finding a duty to arbitrate, yet not 
the sole factor in forcing a successor to arbitrate with the incumbent union.138  
The AmeriSteel court held that Howard Johnson did not resolve the conflict between 
Wiley and Burns; rather, it revealed the Supreme Court’s focus in the Trilogy.139  According to 
the Third Circuit, Howard Johnson took “an expansive view of Burns, repeatedly extolling 
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137 Id. at 268–69.  
138 Id. at 272 n.3. 
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[Burns’] reasoning” and “downplay[ing] the significance of Wiley.”140  In interpreting the 
Trilogy, “Burns . . . provides more persuasive guidance than the limited holding in Wiley.”141  
The AmeriSteel court found that, if an unconsenting successor were held to arbitrate under an 
existing CBA, “the substantive terms of the CBA could be enforced, and thus Burns cannot 
survive intact.”142  In applying Burns, the court found that AmeriSteel could not be bound by the 
substantive terms of the CBA.  Therefore, no arbitration award granted to the union could 
receive judicial sanction, because any award would be based on the substantive terms of the 
CBA. 143  Thus, AmeriSteel could not be obligated to arbitrate, as the arbitration would serve no 
purpose.144  Since there is an inability to hold successor employers to the substantive terms of a 
former CBA, AmeriSteel was found to have no obligations under the Brocker Rebar CBA.145 
B. Local 348-S v. Meridian Management Corp., Second Circuit 
 In Meridian, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey awarded a contract to 
Meridian Management Corporation (“Meridian”) to provide engineering and janitorial services at 
the Jamaica Air Train Terminal at John F. Kennedy International Airport.146  Meridian elected to 
subcontract the janitorial services to Cristi Cleaning Services, Inc. (“Cristi”) under a one-year 
contract.147  At the time that Meridian and Cristi entered the subcontract, Cristi had an existing 
CBA with a labor union representing its janitorial employees.148  Meridian later lawfully 
terminated its subcontract with Cristi and decided to perform the janitorial services itself.149  In 
doing so, Meridian chose to retain the majority of the Cristi employees who had previously 	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141 Id. at 273. 
142 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 272. 
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worked at the terminal.150  The incumbent union then requested that Meridian recognize it as the 
bargaining representative for the employees.151  Meridian declined to do so and, in addition, 
refused to make CBA-mandated contributions to the union’s Health and Welfare Fund.152  The 
union sought to compel Meridian to submit to arbitration as required by the CBA.153  Meridian, 
however, argued that it was not a party to the CBA, and therefore, it should not be bound by any 
of its terms, including the arbitration clause.154 
 The Second Circuit followed AmeriSteel’s methodology in first analyzing each case in 
the Successorship Trilogy to find whether Meridian was required to arbitrate the issue of whether 
and to what extent it was bound by the former CBA.155  Unlike AmeriSteel, however, the Second 
Circuit determined the emphasis of the Trilogy to be the “central role of collective bargaining 
and arbitration in furthering the goals of national labor policy – specifically by avoiding 
industrial strife and encouraging the peaceful resolution of labor disputes.”156  In particular, 
Meridian found protecting workers from sudden changes in the employment relationship to be of 
special significance when examining the successorship doctrine.157 
 When considering whether a duty to arbitrate exists, the majority in Meridian placed 
ultimate importance on the issue of whether there existed substantial continuity of identity of 
business enterprise, with a singular emphasis on the composition of the work force.158  With this 
in mind, the court held that the duty to arbitrate should not be limited to mergers, as in Wiley, and 
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contended instead that continuity of identity can occur in a variety of situations.159  The court 
noted that Meridian hired the majority of Cristi’s employees, who continued doing the same 
work in the same location that they had done for Cristi, and found that there was a “substantial 
continuity of identity” between Meridian and Cristi.160  Further, the court emphasized that the 
employees had worked for Meridian the entire time, even though Meridian had no prior legal 
relationship with the workers, because Meridian was the general contractor when Cristi was 
performing under the subcontract between the parties.161  Based on these facts, the court found 
that Meridian’s status as a successor employer did not automatically bind it to the substantive 
terms of the preexisting CBA.  The court, however, held that, because Meridian maintained 
“substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise” (including the composition of its work 
force), it was required to arbitrate with the union under the arbitration clause of the former 
CBA.162   
The court declined to determine the extent, if any, to which a successor employer was 
bound by the substantive terms of a former CBA, and held that such issue constituted a question 
for the arbitrator.163  The court held that once submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator is “to bring 
his informed judgment to bear in determining” which, if any, of the provisions of the CBA will 
be imposed on the successor employer.164  The court did not suggest any criteria for deciding this 
question, but did note that the arbitration procedure will follow the terms of the arbitration clause 
in the predecessor’s CBA, so long as one exists.165  The court found that enforcing a duty to 
arbitrate is the “most effective way to balance those interests recognized by the Supreme Court[,]” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 74–75. 
161 Id. at 75. 
162 Id. at 66, 76. 
163 Id. at 76. 
164 Local 1115 v. B & K Invs., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 1977); see also NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. 
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 286 (1972). 
165 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 76. 
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and is more effective than anything attempted or accomplished by the parties privately 
bargaining new terms to govern the relationship.166  The court concluded by recognizing and 
rejecting the Third Circuit’s reasoning in AmeriSteel.167  According to the Second Circuit, 
AmeriSteel “eviscerates the protection of employees represented by incumbent unions” and 
contradicts the holding of Wiley.168 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Reconciling the Circuit Split with the Successorship Trilogy and Establishing a Bright-Line 
Rule for the Duty to Arbitrate 
While Meridian properly upheld the principle expressed in Wiley that an unconsenting 
successor employer can be bound to arbitrate under appropriate circumstances, the court erred in 
holding that a “substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise” is the only factor to 
consider when determining whether a duty to arbitrate exists.  On the other hand, AmeriSteel 
ultimately provided the proper outcome in the circuit split, in holding that a successor is not 
bound to arbitrate when only a “substantial continuity of identity of business enterprise” exists. 
AmeriSteel correctly identified “substantial continuity” as a “necessary ingredient,” yet not “the 
sole basis” for finding a duty to arbitrate in a successor employer.169  AmeriSteel, however, failed 
to advance that logic when forming its ultimate solution – that no duty to arbitrate applies to 
unconsenting, non-alter-ego successor employers.170  In doing so, AmeriSteel contradicts Wiley 
by forming an overbroad conclusion “that an arbitration clause of a CBA can never be enforced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 78. 
168 Id. 
169 AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 272 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001). 
170 See id. at 265 (“Because an unconsenting successor cannot be bound by the substantive provisions of its 
predecessor’s agreement, we hold that the successor in this case, appellee AmeriSteel Corporation, cannot be forced 
to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under the agreement.”). 
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against an [unconsenting] successor.”171  AmeriSteel finds that the duty to arbitrate, enforceable 
in Wiley, must not be ordered because unconsenting successors cannot be forced to arbitrate 
“when ultimately it can serve no purpose.”172  In holding that, as a consequence of Burns, a duty 
to arbitrate would be futile for unconsenting successors, AmeriSteel implies that Howard 
Johnson and Burns have overruled Wiley.173  Yet, the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule 
Wiley in Burns or Howard Johnson, and only the Court or Congress may overrule its 
precedent,174 not the federal appellate courts.175  Therefore, AmeriSteel arrives at a proper 
conclusion in not imposing a duty to arbitrate, but does so using flawed reasoning.  
 On the other hand, Meridian properly recognizes Wiley’s continued vitality, but 
erroneously applies and interprets its holding.  Meridian “confuses the circumstances in which a 
‘successor employer’ has a duty to recognize and bargain with a labor union, with much more 
limited circumstances in which that employer is bound to arbitrate with a union under a [CBA] to 
which it has not agreed.”176  The court simply applies the Fall River factors, used to identify “the 
existence or non-existence of substantial continuity in the context of assessing the duty to 
bargain[,]” and examines continuity of work force to determine whether a successor employer 
has a duty arbitrate as well.177  By conflating the duty to bargain with the duty to arbitrate, 
Meridian ignores the enhanced standards established in Wiley and Howard Johnson, and instead, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Id. at 281 (Becker, C.J., dissenting). 
172 Id. at 265 (majority opinion). 
173 Id. at 280 (Becker, C.J., dissenting). 
174 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (“[S]tare decisis does not prevent [the United States Supreme 
Court] from overruling a previous decision . . . .  ‘[I]f a precedent of [the United States Supreme Court] has direct 
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175 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). 
176 Local 348-S v. Meridian Mgmt. Corp., 583 F.3d 65, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2009) (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 74 (majority opinion).  
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simplistically requires simply a showing of “substantial continuity” in applying either duty.178  
By melding the two separate levels of liability, Meridian creates a lower standard than the 
Supreme Court intended for determining a duty to arbitrate.  Based on the Second Circuit’s 
construction, the duty to arbitrate would effectively eclipse the duty to bargain and render it 
valueless to successor employers attempting to negotiate a new CBA.179  As a result, unions 
would have no incentive to bargain toward a new CBA, when they can instead compel a 
successor employer to arbitrate whether, and to what extent, it must comply with the substantive 
terms of the predecessor’s CBA.  And, in other words, “all successor employers who hire the 
bulk of a predecessor’s employees[,]” would have a duty to arbitrate the extent to which they are 
bound by the prior CBA.180   
 To determine whether successor employers should be obligated to arbitrate, the courts 
should first look to long-established scenarios, where successors have been held to the terms of 
the CBA.181  In doing so, the courts should form a bright-line rule, which categorizes the various 
scenarios in which a duty to arbitrate will be found.  To a large degree, a bright-line rule will 
remove the confusion of the lower courts in applying the successorship doctrine.  Under such a 
rule, a duty to arbitrate should be found only: (1) when a successor employer has implicitly or 
explicitly assumed the CBA, (2) when a successor employer is an alter ego of the predecessor, 
(3) when a successor employer is a product of a merger with the predecessor (whereby the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 See id. (“We have previously used the Fall River factors to make a fact-specific finding that a successor 
corporation was bound by a predecessor’s CBA, at least to the extent of its arbitration clause.  Looking at those 
factors in this case, it is apparent that this particular employer, Meridian, should be required to arbitrate the degree to 
which it is otherwise bound by the CBA.”).  
179 See id. at 80 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
180 Id. at 80. 
181 Id. at 84. 
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predecessor ceases to exist) and substantial continuity exists, or (4) when substantial continuity 
exists and state successor liability law supports a requirement to arbitrate.182  
Under the first two scenarios, the assumption of the CBA and the alter ego doctrine, the 
circuits widely agree that a successor employer must adopt the former CBA, and thus, a duty to 
arbitrate must naturally follow, along with all other obligations of the former CBA.183  The last 
two categories of the bright-line rule, however, are not as established as the former categories, 
and have never been a primary basis for imposing the entirety of the CBA on a successor 
employer.  Historically, however, such factors have been considered to be important 
circumstances in finding a duty to arbitrate.184 
Absent a finding of an alter ego successorship or assumption of the CBA, the centerpiece 
of the Supreme Court’s analysis of when a successor can be bound to arbitrate is a finding of 
“substantial continuity of identity of the business enterprise.”185  In Wiley, once the Court 
concluded that “substantial continuity” existed, it looked to other factors, such as common law 
successor liability rules, to support a duty to arbitrate.186  Furthermore, nowhere in Howard 
Johnson does the Court state that “substantial continuity” is the sole basis for finding a duty to 
arbitrate.187  Thus, the successorship doctrine treats “substantial continuity” as a “necessary but 
not sufficient condition for concluding that a successor employer is bound to arbitrate under a 
predecessor’s CBA.”188  As previously mentioned, in analyzing “substantial continuity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 84 (Livingston, J., dissenting).; NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 286 
(1972) (“[The] narrower holding dealt with a merger occurring against a background of state law that embodied the 
general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing 
corporation.”). 
183 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 79 (Livingston, J., dissenting).  
184 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964). 
185 AmeriSteel Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267 F.3d 264, 281 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (Becker, C.J., dissenting). 
186 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550. 
187 Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel and Rest. Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974). 
188 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 83 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
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identity of business enterprise,” the Fall River factors must be satisfied and, as noted in Howard 
Johnson, a particular emphasis is placed on the “continuity of work force.”189 
Based on the Trilogy, in the merger context where the predecessor disappears, a 
successor employer always should have a duty to arbitrate if there is substantial continuity.190  It 
is significant that the predecessor ceases to exist after the merger because, in the absence of the 
former employer, the union loses the party against whom they can bring employment disputes.  
The survival of the predecessor employer is key to protecting the interests of the workers 
because the union will have a “realistic remedy to enforce their contractual obligations” against 
the surviving former employer.191  Thus, a merger, in this context, would erase the former 
employer and the workers’ ability to resolve disputes.  Therefore, the successor employer should 
retain a duty to arbitrate so that the workers’ rightful expectations are preserved. 
Finally, a duty to arbitrate should also be found when both (1) “substantial continuity” is 
met and (2) successor liability state law exists that supports a reasonable expectation that the 
successor employer would be liable for the CBA.192  In Wiley, the Court emphasized that, in 
addition to “substantial continuity,” state corporate law supporting continuing liability for 
successors was important to its result.193  In the Court’s view, such state laws, when sufficiently 
strong, could establish a reasonable expectation of continuing liability.194  In fact, each case of 
the Trilogy referred to the state law background as support to “substantial continuity,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 263. 
190 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549; see also Century Vertical Systems, Inc. v. Local No. 1, 379 F. App’x. 68, 70 (2d Cir. 
2010) (“[I]n appropriate circumstances a successor employer can be bound by the arbitration provision contained in 
a CBA entered into by the predecessor employer. . . .  These circumstances include, but are not limited to, those 
cases where the contracting employer disappears into another by merger[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
191 Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257; see also Meridian, 583 F.3d at 71.  
192 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 81 (Livingston, J., dissenting).  
193 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1964). 
194 See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 84 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
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demonstrating that the Court did not consider “substantial continuity” to be an exclusive factor in 
finding a duty to arbitrate.195  
Therefore, where “substantial continuity” exists, but the successor is not an alter ego, has 
not expressly or impliedly assumed the CBA, or has not merged with and eliminated the 
predecessor, “[s]tate law may be utilized so far as it is of aid in the development of correct 
principles or their application in a particular case[.]”196  This does not mean, however, that the 
principles of law governing ordinary contracts will dictate the obligation to arbitrate, because it 
is well established that a CBA “is not an ordinary contract.”197  Instead, under this scenario, the 
state successor liability law that covers the type of transaction or business restructuring at hand 
(e.g., merger, stock acquisition, or assets purchase) should be used as an additional factor in 
determining a duty to arbitrate.198   
Generally, under state successor liability law, “if corporations merge or engage in a stock 
purchase or exchange, the successor corporation is . . . liable for the obligations of the 
predecessor.” 199   “When one corporation purchases the assets of another, [however,] the 
purchaser is generally not liable for the obligations of the seller.”200  Therefore, when applying 
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196 Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548. 
197 Id. at 550. 
198 See Meridian, 583 F.3d at 83 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (“Because the successorship doctrine is a creature of 
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the fourth prong of the proposed rule in most jurisdictions, the state successorship liability laws 
provide support for a duty to arbitrate in a stock acquisition transaction or merger.  Under these 
two scenarios, however, “substantial continuity” must remain the central focus, with the 
emphasis on “continuity of work force.”  Therefore, under the fourth prong, as long as “there is 
an accepted common law basis for imposing contractual successor liability” and “substantial 
continuity” is met, a successor employer will have a duty to arbitrate with the incumbent union 
because such a duty is “fairly within the reasonable expectations of the parties.”201 
Although the Court has denied formal recognition of the taxonomy of state corporate law 
transaction,202 it has, in fact, implicitly “relied on the form of the transaction, that is, on the fact 
that Howard Johnson involved an asset sale rather than a merger [like Wiley].” 203  Further, it is 
worth noting that AmeriSteel and a recent Wisconsin district court case, Freitas v. Republic 
Airways Holdings, Inc.,204 which both found the respective successor employers to have no 
arbitration obligations, involved the sale of assets as well. Thus, “[t]he Court’s reliance on this 
corporate law distinction supports the claim that the corporate taxonomy provides a useful basis 
for . . . [the] labor law successorship doctrine.”205     
Chief Judge Becker, dissenting in AmeriSteel, offered an alternate reconciliation of the 
Trilogy, suggesting a “sliding scale” approach for determining what can be imposed on 
successors.206  He proposed that by using the Successorship Trilogy as a guide, burdens ranging 
from no obligations to the imposition of an entire CBA should be imposed on successors based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Meridian, 583 F.3d at 84 (Livingston, J., dissenting); Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 263. 
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   30	  
on the corresponding strength of the successor relationship.207  The dissent seems to base the 
“sliding scale” test mainly on the presence of a merger or sale of assets, not as much on 
continuity of work force, thus ignoring the central consideration in imputing a duty to arbitrate 
identified in Howard Johnson.208  A “sliding scale” approach fails for multiple reasons.  First, 
such a test is exceedingly imprecise, especially in such an unsettled area.  Second, due to its 
malleability, a sliding scale can be easily abused and used as an excuse for pushing forward 
various policy agendas by either pro-labor union or pro-employer courts.  Third, there are only 
three tiers in the sliding scale (i.e., a duty to bargain, a duty to arbitrate, and an adoption of the 
terms of the predecessor’s CBA); thus, the sliding scale ignores the standards for each of these 
obligations already established by the Supreme Court.   
Other scholars have attempted to resolve the conflicting holdings of AmeriSteel and 
Meridian.209  For example, in “Reading the Fine Print,” the author provides that the duty to 
arbitrate is “limited to situations involving virtual identity of business operations between the 
predecessor and successor employers,” 210  but does not provide a clear standard of 
implementation for the courts.  Rather, this commentator simply restates the two well-recognized 
situations – alter ego and assumption of CBA terms – in identifying when a successor employer 
will be bound to the substantive terms of its predecessor’s CBA.211  Further, like AmeriSteel, 
many of these articles have “emasculated Wiley” and downplayed its important role in the 
Trilogy.212  Such critics of Wiley have stated that “substantial continuity analysis is only relevant 
to the issue of union recognition[,]” thereby supporting the erroneous view that Wiley is 	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208 Id.; Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 263–65.  
209 See McCluer, supra note 16; see also Teters, supra note 21. 
210 McCluer, supra note 16, at 105.  
211 Id. at 106. 
212 AmeriSteel, 267 F.3d at 280 (Becker, C.J., dissenting); see also McCluer, supra note 16, at 106; see also Teters, 
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“virtually dead letter confined to its specific facts, essentially overruled” by Burns.213  In forming 
these conclusions, these critics channel the same flawed logic as AmeriSteel in contending, “that 
an arbitration clause of a CBA can never be enforced against an [unconsenting] successor[,]” 
despite the fact that Howard Johnson and Wiley each recognized the existence of a successor’s 
duty to arbitrate.214   
B. The Practical Effects of Meridian 
By imposing a duty to arbitrate on successor employers solely based on the “substantial 
continuity” factor, Meridian complicates an already widely recognized problem in 
successorship.215  A finding of “substantial continuity” already imposes a duty to bargain on a 
successor; however, by Meridian’s holding, such a finding now imposes a duty to arbitrate.  
Imposing a duty to arbitrate in this context has a dangerous effect on the transactions by which a 
successor takes control of another business.  An employer can become a successor and 
potentially become exposed to obligations via a variety of transactions, such as a partial 
acquisition or total acquisition of assets, a lease, a subcontract, a competitive bidding process, a 
leveraged buyout, or even a bankruptcy sale.216  Thus, according to Meridian, in a multitude of 
common and frequent transactions, the heavier burden to arbitrate could now attach to a new 
employer, so long as “substantial continuity” is fulfilled.  Even under the lesser burden to 
bargain, a trend of “union-avoidance” has previously been recognized in successor employer 
transactions. 217   Thus, by imposing a harsher duty to arbitrate on successors, Meridian 
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exacerbates this risk and, in turn, hurts the same labor unions and workers it attempts to 
protect.218  
Successor employers “have no legal obligation to hire the old unionized employees or to 
even give them preference in hiring – even if the entity plans to continue doing the exact same 
work.”219  So long as the successor hires a minority of the old unionized employees or less, the 
successor will not be bound by the CBA, nor will it even be compelled to recognize or bargain 
with the union at all.220  In effect, Meridian “[increases] the incentives for would-be successor 
employers to simply fire the unionized employees and start over[.]”221  Such an outcome “is 
hardly a manifest victory for the cause of organized labor[,]” since it effectively devastates the 
very industrial peace and employee interests that the court lauded as an overriding policy 
concern in all successorship circumstances.222  
Further, the NLRA’s antidiscrimination provision, Section 8(a)(3), which was designed 
to protect unionized workers from anti-union behavior, has been largely ineffective.223  While “a 
new employer cannot refuse to rehire the old employees solely because they are in a union . . . 
employers will often be able to find ample business reasons to justify refusing to rehire old 
employees.”224  A mass non-hiring of predecessor union employees is typically not taken as 
sufficient in finding a discriminatory dismissal.225  Instead, there must be direct and substantial 
evidence of anti-union sentiment by the successor employer, and this kind of evidence is seldom 
available from sophisticated employers.226  Thus, although perhaps suspicious, a successor 
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employer has the right to refuse to hire an experienced, unionized work force, in favor of 
unskilled employees without violating Section 8(a)(3).227  Not only will such behavior displace 
skilled laborers causing industrial strife, strikes, and increased unemployment, but also will 
result in social turmoil and additional expenses for the employer.228   
Even in avoidance of the lesser duty to bargain, successor employers have gone to great 
lengths by incurring added expenses and devising strategies to avoid hiring predecessor 
employees.229  When skilled laborers have been dismissed in favor of a largely inexperienced 
work force, a greater number of laborers are needed to do the jobs of former employees, resulting 
in lower productivity and greater inefficiency.230  For example (as mentioned earlier), at a 
meatpacking plant, where inexperienced laborers replaced union workers, the substitutes were 
almost 90% slower and “turned out to be so incompetent that the meat had to be destroyed.”231  
Such problems can also result in unnecessary expenses for the successor in defending a variety 
of tort claims (such as product liability and workplace injuries), increased training expenses of 
inexperienced workers, and recruiting expenses in finding substitute employees.  Thus, Meridian 
creates a greater incentive for anti-union hiring behavior, so that “substantial continuity” is not 
apparent, and all union obligations associated with a CBA, to which the new employer was not a 
party, can be avoided.  
Moreover, a duty to arbitrate could deter employers from even venturing into a successor 
transaction.  The imposition of a duty to arbitrate may discourage and inhibit the transfer of 	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capital.232  Corporations may be reluctant to acquire other businesses if they believe they might 
be saddled with another company’s CBA.233  Additionally, by imposing a duty to arbitrate under 
the same standard used to find a duty to bargain, the obligations found in arbitration may not 
correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties.234  Instead, when “substantial 
continuity” is satisfied, it is best to balance the bargaining advantage between employers and 
unions by the economic powers of the parties.235  Labor policy is ill-served by binding parties to 
terms that do not correspond to the economic strengths of the parties.236  For example, by 
imposing a duty to arbitrate, a union may be forced to retain terms that were made to a smaller 
employer, that are customized to those particular circumstances, and which it would not want 
imposed if a larger or more financially robust firm should acquire the business.237  Under such a 
scenario, a duty to bargain would better serve both parties rather than a duty to arbitrate.  
Therefore, unwanted consequences likely will result from the imposition of Meridian’s 
erroneous holding, which imposes the more stringent duty to arbitrate under the same standard as 
a duty to bargain.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The successorship doctrine has long proven itself to be difficult to navigate, causing 
courts to confuse successor obligations, standards used to impose requirements, and national 
labor policy responsibilities.  Therefore, unless the Supreme Court revisits this unclear area of 
law, the lower courts should adopt a bright-line rule, which firmly establishes when a duty to 
arbitrate should be imposed on successors.  A bright-line rule eliminates subjective, and 
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occasionally biased, pro-labor union or pro-employer interpretations of the Successorship 
Trilogy, which have further deepened the rift between the courts in applying a duty to arbitrate.  
Just as the Court set forth a factor-based test in imposing a duty to bargain, the same 
methodology should be applied to the duty to arbitrate, so that confusion can similarly be 
resolved.  A bright-line rule serves to create and enforce expectations of both labor unions and 
successor employers, where the parties will then enter certain transactions with the 
understanding of the unavoidable duties and liabilities that come with the territory.  Thus, 
unionized workers’ interests will be preserved when changes present themselves in ordinary 
employer transitions, and successor employers will be fairly held to anticipated duties and 
liabilities.  In turn, a great deal of the “union avoidance” gamesmanship, naturally resulting from 
Meridian, will be stopped dead in its tracks.  Successors will continue to enjoy a symbiotic 
relationship with labor unions, where the employer gets the benefit of a highly productive and 
skilled labor force and the work force can fairly bargain the terms of their employment – all 
while avoiding an unnecessary hemorrhaging of secured union jobs. 
